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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Institute for Transport Studies at the University of Leeds has been commissioned 
through measure2improve, on behalf of the NHT Network, and the HMEP (Highway 
Maintenance Efficiency Programme) to undertake a follow-on study of statistical 
benchmarking for the HMEP CQC Project which proceeds from the pilot study of 2013. The 
analysis uses Customer, Quality and Cost data gathered for four highway maintenance 
functions from 65 participating English Local Authorities. The functions considered are 
Highway Pavement Maintenance, Street Lighting, Winter Service and Gully Clearance. 
Background to CQC  
Since April 2009 the National Highways & Transport Network has been exploring the 
relationship between Satisfied Customers, Cost Effective Delivery and Technical Quality 
which are generally considered to be the three key components of all round excellent 
performance, the ‘three legs’ of the performance stool. 
It has been doing this by bringing together the views of Customers, Quality data and Cost for 
individual local highway authorities across the country with a view to identifying and sharing 
efficiency, improvement and best practice. The work has been given the acronym title CQC.  
CQC is the first time these three crucial strands of performance have been brought together 
in this way for the sector and it offers more reasoned, balanced and objective ways of 
measuring and comparing performance, whilst also offering opportunities for seeking and 
delivering improvements.    
The NHT Network is in a unique position to make this evaluation, using the results of the 
NHT Public Survey, which provide the first national benchmarks of customer issues and 
satisfaction in the Highways and Transport Sector.   
The Highway Maintenance Efficiency Programme (HMEP) has recognized that CQC offers the 
sector the prospect of a consistent and verifiable means of measuring efficiency for 
different strands of service and has provided funding to develop CQC work in relation to 
maintenance to provide the following:  
1 A sector definition of efficiency  
2 A verifiable means of evaluating and comparing efficiency 
3 Context and insight into factors affecting efficiency 
4 A means of identifying exponents of efficient services for knowledge sharing purposes  
5 Potential targets for efficiency savings  
6 A verifiable means of quality cross checking after savings have been delivered  
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Aims of the Statistical Benchmarking analysis 
For each of the four cost models the aim of this work is to: 
 Develop a minimum cost frontier, which provides an expression for how (efficient) cost 
is affected by multiple cost drivers 
 To provide measures as to the extent that each authority is away from the frontier, that 
is the extent to which an authority is above its minimum cost of providing the current 
level of service 
 
Confidentiality of data and results 
The study recognises that cost benchmarking is a sensitive subject. As such as part of the 
agreement of collecting data from participating authorities, this study will not release the 
base data or release results which would identify the efficiency opportunity for any specific 
authorities.  
 
Purpose of this report 
The aim of this report is to outline the results of this work. The report majors on three 
aspects of the work: 
 Concepts and background to the approach 
 Data issues 
 The presentation of a model for each of the four cost categories, namely road 
maintenance, street lighting, winter service and drainage. 
 
Structure of this report 
Following this introduction, section 2 outlines the key economic concepts relevant to the 
analysis. Section 3 discusses the new data set and how this is a development on that 
available for the pilot study. Section 4-7 provide descriptions of the cost models and 
outlines summarises of the efficiency predictions.  
  4 
 
2. ECONOMIC BENCHMARKING CONCEPTS 
In this section the relevant economic concepts are discussed. The Appendix provides more 
information and also discusses statistical issues in more detail. 
The cost frontier: an alternative to KPIs 
In this work we use statistical techniques to estimate the minimum cost relationship 
between cost (of an activity in a highway department) and the drivers of cost, such as the 
number of street lights to be maintained (the output) and also the quality of the output, 
such as citizen satisfaction with street lighting. This is called the minimum cost frontier.  
It is important to accurately model the cost frontier, rather than, say, just comparing unit 
costs across authorities, since there are many reasons why authorities costs can differ, many 
of which are due to factors outside of the control of authorities. Thus to get a measure of 
the potential cost saving which an authority could realise if they adopted best practice, but 
still continued to provide the same service at the same quality, requires controlling for these 
factors simultaneously i.e. modelling the cost frontier.  
Figure 1 is a visualisation of the relationship between street lighting costs and number of 
street lights (an obvious cost driver!). What is important to note about Figure 1 is that the 
cost frontier is drawn in two dimensions. As such it shows the relationship between cost and 
a single cost driver, holding all other cost drivers constant. Figure 1 is thus a two 
dimensional visualisation of a multi-dimensional problem – this should not be confused with 
partial (unit cost) analysis. Ultimately a similar diagram can be drawn with respect to each 
cost driver and indeed for each cost driver at different levels of other cost drivers. 
Figure 1 Reasons why unit cost may differ due to (a) scale effects and (b) quality effects 
 (a) (b) 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates two scenarios where authorities have very different cost and average 
(unit) costs but are all efficient, in the sense that they are producing the service at the given 
quality level at minimum possible cost. 
Numbe
r of 
street 
lights 
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r of 
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lights 
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Panel (a) illustrates the potential impact of ‘economies of scale’. This is economics 
terminology for decreasing unit (average) cost as the size of the operation is increased. 
Intuitively this arises because fixed costs (depot cost etc) can be spread over more units of 
output. As such authorities A, B and C are all producing at minimum possible cost but A’s 
unit costs are much greater than B and C’s. Unless A is allowed to merge its highway 
operations with another authority, it cannot be expected to reduce unit costs any further. 
Note that when we do the model estimation, we do not assume economies of scale are 
present. Instead we let the data determine whether economies of scale (or otherwise) are 
present. 
Panel (b) illustrates the effect of differing quality between authorities. A lower quality of 
service may be expected to result in lower costs, for a given number of street lighting units. 
Thus it can be seen that all authorities A-E are producing at minimum cost but have 
different unit costs due to differing number of street lights and quality combinations. 
Economic efficiency 
In sum, Figure 1 provides a motivation for why there is a need to move away from simple 
unit cost comparisons. Now we need to establish in what sense an authority can actually be 
‘inefficient’ and thus have the potential to make savings while still maintaining the same 
service level and quality. It is important to note that the following is a theoretical discussion 
based on a fully specified economic cost model. In reality the analysis makes best use of the 
available data, but is still an abstraction from the complex reality. As such care should be 
taken in how to interpret the ‘inefficiency’ opportunity (see next section).  
An authority must be above or on the frontier as by definition it cannot provide its outputs 
(for a given quality) at less than the minimum possible cost. If an authority is ‘on’ the 
frontier then it is producing at the minimum possible cost for the given set of outputs and 
quality that it provides. In this case the authority is termed fully efficient. If the authority is 
producing its output (again for a given quality) above minimum cost then it is termed 
inefficient.  
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Figure 2: illustration of the cost frontier and efficiency 
 
We measure the degree to which authorities are fully efficient by the efficiency score. This is 
a number between 0 and 1. 1 indicates that the authority is fully efficient, anything less than 
1 indicates that the authority could continue to produce its level of output, maintain the 
same quality but at lower cost; the exact cost proportion given by the score. For example an 
efficiency score of 0.8 indicates that an authority can potentially reduce costs by 20% of the 
current level and still maintain the same output (and quality) as at present. 
So in summary, using frontier benchmarking produces a single measure of performance and 
provides a financial quantification as to the scope for improvement. This is opposed to 
partial Key Performance Indicators, which by construction yield many different measures of 
performance.1 
Caution in literal interpretation of efficiency scores 
It is tempting (and potentially alarming!) to conclude that an authority with an efficiency 
score of 0.6 should be required to make a 40% cost saving. This can be misleading for two 
sets of reasons. Firstly there will be limitations in the data and analysis and such factors are 
clearly evident in this pilot study (which is to be expected). In particular: 
                                                     
 
1 This should not be taken to mean that KPIs do not have a strong role to play in 
understanding performance. They are easily understood and are very clear 
communications tools. Different benchmarking tools have different pros and cons and 
thus understanding data through a wide range of techniques is often optimal to support 
robust decision making. Thus this work should be seen in the context of wider 
benchmarking activities within the CQC project and HMEP in general. 
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 The models use a limited set of cost driving variables. It is likely that there are other 
variables that explain costs which are not included in the model. The result of omitting 
such variables tends to inflate the opportunity between the estimated minimum cost 
frontier and the authorities actual cost. Thus efficiency scores tend to be too low. 
 There is some statistical imprecision with respect to the minimum cost frontier given the 
sample size partly driven by missing observations. The impact of this is that the cost 
frontier may not be as reflective of the true cost structure as would be possible with 
more complete observations. For example, some variables were found to have a counter 
intuitive influence on cost (e.g. reduced cost rather than increased cost) which meant 
that they were removed from the specification. This may not have been the case if more 
complete observations were available. Ultimately it should be clear from Figure 1 that 
there is interplay between the measure of efficiency and the cost frontier so if the cost 
frontier is forced to be simplistic it can yield inaccurate efficiency scores. 
In addition to these statistical factors, there are more general caveats in interpreting top-
down efficiency scores. Fundamentally the efficiency score quantifies an unexplained 
‘opportunity’ between actual and modelled minimum cost. Not all of this opportunity will be 
under the authority’s control for the following reasons: 
 Missing cost drivers which are outside of the authority’s control which act to inflate their 
costs relative to other authorities. The analysis can only control for what is actually 
included in the model. Thus an authority is being penalised in the analysis for just facing 
different operating conditions rather than being truly inefficient (an example would be 
failure to control for topographical factors in winter maintenance which would penalise 
those authorities subject to unfavourable environmental factors). 
 Identification of best practice techniques: The model does identify which authorities are 
efficient, however why they are efficient is not indicated. This requires further ‘bottom-
up’ analysis to compare practices between the efficient and inefficient authorities. In 
undertaking such an analysis it may be concluded that it is not feasible to introduce all of 
the process reforms for various reasons e.g. incompatibility with fixed capital 
infrastructure. 
 Phasing issues: it takes time to introduce cost reduction measures; thus efficiency scores 
are (at best) long term targets. 
The Mathematical Cost Frontier 
In practice the cost frontier is represented by a mathematical equation. This allows for the 
effect on cost of multiple cost drivers to be controlled for simultaneously.  
Thus while the graphical representation in Figure 1 is useful for illustrating the relationship 
between cost and a single output, this has to be drawn holding the levels of all other cost 
  8 
 
drivers constant. If we were to change the level of another cost driver, then the frontier 
would ‘shift’ up or down. So, for example if Figure 1 represents the relationship between 
street lighting cost and number of lighting units for a given quality level (measured as 
percentage of street lighting units operational at one time). If the quality was to improve we 
may expect that the cost frontier would shift upwards. That is for any number of street 
lights, the (minimum) cost of maintaining it at a higher quality is greater than at a lower 
quality.  
In most applications, the mathematical equation has the cost drivers transformed by 
logarithms as this makes computation of cost efficiency easier. So a cost function would look 
something like: 
Log(min cost) = a0 + a1 . Log (cost driver 1) + a2 . Log (cost driver 2) + … 
   … + ak . Log (cost driver k) 
 We use data on costs and cost drivers (that were supplied by participating authorities) to 
estimate the parameters (a0, …, ak). Following estimation we then have an equation that 
allows us to predict minimum cost for any combination of the levels of the cost drivers. This 
can allow undertaking of ‘what if’ analysis, such as what would happen to cost 
 if authorities merged highway functions and so doubled street light numbers for a 
given operation 
 if an authority increased the percentage of street lighting units operational by, say 
1% 
 if an authority was prepared to reduce  citizen satisfaction by 1% 
One important caveat to the above is that the model parameters are estimated using data. 
This has two implications in this context. Firstly, there will be a degree of error relating to 
the estimated value relative to the ‘true’ value. We summarise the degree of error in each 
parameter estimate by computation of a standard error. 
Secondly, and intuitively, the model will be most representative of actual costs when we 
consider what if scenarios which are close to data that we already observe. Clearly there is 
more extrapolation (and thus more margin for error) if we try and predict the cost impact of 
doing something that is far different to what we have now (far ‘out of sample’). An example 
would be a ‘what if’ experiment involving the creation of a ‘super authority’, which would 
be double the size of anything that exists in the analysis already. 
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3. THE UPDATED DATA SET  
Introduction 
Following the Pilot Study of 2013, a much more targeted and refined data collection 
exercise was undertaken for this study. It was decided to develop further the three cost 
categories previously studied, as well as beginning work on a new cost category, drainage.  
The data collection, broadly, included two sources of data; those sourced direct (and in 
confidence) from participating local authorities and those sourced from existing data 
sources in the public domain. Crucially the cost information is direct from Local Authorities, 
as this allowed a more consistent and targeted set of definitions for each cost category. 
Data was requested for five years from 2008 to 2013. An observation is a statistical term 
used to describe a single entry in a dataset. In this case it refers to an entry for a certain 
Authority for a given year. Thus an Authority has up to 5 entries in the dataset (one for each 
year).  
However, understandably, not all Authorities were able to supply information for all cost 
and cost drivers requested. As such, both before and during model estimation, it was/is 
necessary to balance the need to explain costs by as many (relevant) cost drivers as possible 
whilst also ensuring that as many as possible Authorities are included in the estimation. The 
latter concern is important for two reasons. First, there is the benefit of likely increased 
statistical precision from including as many observations as possible. Second, the inclusion 
of more Authorities means that the model can predict the cost frontier (and thus give a 
measure of ‘efficiency’) of as many Authorities as possible (however note that we do plan to 
make some assumptions about some of the other authorities to use the model to predict 
the cost frontier – see below). 
The cost data 
Table 1 summarises the cost data available for the study and itemises the number of 
observations available for analysis of each cost category taking into account the availability 
of other variables for the analysis.  
In general it can be seen that there are many more complete observations available for this 
follow-on study than for the pilot. New cost categories are also available for analysis. Finally, 
as will be described in the following sections, many more cost driving variables are available 
to explain these costs and thus the dataset is a clear step forward from that used in the pilot 
study. 
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Table 1 Summary of the cost data available for analysis  
Cost Category  Observations
 
 Authorities Cost Drivers  
Roads 
Maintenance 
(Reactive + Structural 
Maintenance)  
145 51  Highway length by road type 
 Traffic volume 
 Road Condition Index by road type 
 Urban/rural mix 
 Citizen satisfaction  
Street Lighting  180 50  Number of lighting columns 
 % of units operational 
 Citizens Satisfaction with Street Lighting 
Repairs 
Winter 
maintenance   
120 34  Highway length by road type 
 Length of Precautionary Salting Network 
 Number of Non Precautionary Days 
 Tonnes of salt used 
 Percentage of road length classified as rural 
 The total of Tonnes of Salt used per annum  
 Citizen Satisfaction with Winter Maintenance  
Gullies and 
other 
131 40  Number of gullies 
 Number of gullies cleared per annum 
 Proportion of network in rural areas 
 Proportion of network which is U road  
 
Cost drivers sourced directly from Local Authorities 
In addition to the cost data, data on certain cost drivers not already (easily) in the public 
domain has been sourced directly from Authorities. Such data includes: 
 Proportion of street lighting operational at a given time (Street Lighting model) 
 Tonnes of salt used in Winter Operations (Winter maintenance model) 
 Number of Gritting runs (Winter Maintenance model) 
 Number of Gullies (Gullies Model) 
 Number of Gullies Cleared (Gullies Model) 
Some of the data was not fully populated and as such using these cost drivers does restrict 
the number of complete observations which can be included in any models (i.e. the choice 
of cost driver influences the number of complete observations in Table 1).  
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Cost drivers sourced from the NHT Customer Satisfaction Survey 
The study also draws on the Customer Satisfaction Survey data collected by the NHT. With a 
few exceptions, this data is available for all Authorities and so using it does not constrain the 
number of complete observations. 
Cost drivers sourced from public data sources 
As well as a more detailed and targeted cost data collection exercise, we have also collected 
data on cost drivers, which is in the public domain. Such data has been very useful for the 
highway pavement maintenance model reported in the next section, but also of use for the 
other models. Further this data is available for (nearly) all observations so inclusion of these 
variables does not reduce the sample size. 
Such data includes: 
 Highway length by road type 
 Traffic volume 
 Road Condition Index by road type (allowing a weighted average to be computed for 
the whole network) 
 Length of road network which is urban/rural 
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4. HIGHWAY PAVEMENT MAINTENANCE MODEL 
This section and the following three sections discuss each cost model in turn.  
The Cost Frontier 
The cost variable is the sum of reactive and structural maintenance. Some supplementary 
analysis has been undertaken on reactive and structural spend individually, however to keep 
the presentation simple, only the total model is discussed below. The results for the 
supplementary models are broadly in line with the total model however. 
The sum of reactive and structural maintenance is explained by the following cost drivers: 
 Length of the sum of A, B and C classified roads (disaggregating further did not yield 
sensible results) 
 Length of U classified Roads 
 Traffic per Annum (measured as number of vehicle-km) 
 The road condition measure (a weighted average of the road condition measures for 
A roads, B and C roads and U roads) 
 The influence of citizen satisfaction  
 Time dummy variables which pick up systematic variations in expenditure over time 
(such as the results of abnormally severe winters) 
For reference, Table 2 presents the parameter estimates of the model. Unlike the models 
reported in the pilot study2, the model below uses a Translog flexible functional form. 
Adopting such a functional form means that the cost frontier is very flexible in terms of its 
shape. The implication is that this model should provide a ‘tighter fit’ to the data and thus 
maximise the chance of Authorities being found to be near the cost frontier.  
                                                     
 
2 The pilot study did consider the use of flexible functional forms, however the number of 
data points and data quality meant that this approach was not feasible. 
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Table 2 Cost frontier parameter estimates  
 
   
   
 Coefficient Prob.   
   
   C 12.07246 0.0000 
LOG(Length of A_B_C Roads) 0.598615 0.0180 
LOG(Length of A_B_C Roads) ^2 0.252549 0.4143 
YEAR=2009 -0.059898 0.6680 
YEAR=2010 0.009003 0.9397 
YEAR=2011 0.066629 0.6105 
YEAR=2012 -0.000795 0.9950 
LOG(Length of U Roads) 0.070764 0.8121 
LOG(Length of U Roads)^2 1.000454 0.1191 
LOG(Length of A_B_C Roads)* LOG(Length of U Roads) -0.978451 0.2651 
RDC 0.023207 0.0051 
LOG(Traffic Density) 0.106203 0.5454 
Citizen Satisfaction 0.389815 0.0108 
Citizen Satisfaction ^2 (squared) -0.011979 0.0136 
Citizen Satisfaction ^3 (cubed) 0.000117 0.0185 
   
   
 
Number of observations =145 , Number of Authorities = 51 
Unfortunately, the extra flexibility of the model makes interpretation of the coefficients a 
little more involved. However we do note that, in general, this model seems to have 
sensible economic/engineering properties, namely: 
 At the sample mean of the data (for the ‘average’ Authority) increasing traffic on the 
network by 1% increases maintenance costs by 0.11%. This is intuitive because only a 
fraction of maintenance costs is driven directly by usage damage. We do note that 
this variable is not statistically significant and so we cannot say decisively that it does 
drive cost however we retain it given the intuitive sign. 
 Again at the sample mean of the data, increasing the size of an Authority’s road 
network by 1% increases costs by 0.67%. Again this is intuitive given that some costs 
of road maintenance are fixed irrespective of what work is undertaken. However for 
very large Authorities a 1% increase in road length increases costs by more than 1%, 
  14 
 
indicating that at a certain road length there are coordination problems. Thus there 
is an optimal size of a highway authority.3  
The relationship between a 1% change in size of an authority’s network and the 
corresponding % change in cost is called scale elasticity, e.g. 1% increase in scale implying 
0.67% increase in cost as above is represented as 0.67. Figure 3 below shows the plot of the 
scale elasticity for the (145) observations within the dataset. It clearly shows an upward 
relationship, with the ‘minimum efficient scale point’ (MESP) somewhere in the order of 6 
000 to 10 000 km (the exact MESP depends on the mix of U road to A,B,C road length in the 
authority). The MESP represents the level of scale, here road length, where average costs 
(cost per highway-km) are minimum. So it is important to note that an elasticity value less 
than one does not imply a fall in absolute cost from growing the authority size, only that 
average cost falls as the authority gets larger (up to the MESP and then average costs start 
to rise).
                                                     
 
3 We do note that the second order terms (the squares and cross products) are each 
individually not statistically from zero at any reasonable significance level (e.g. 10%). 
However they are jointly significant, that is the null hypothesis that all the coefficients on 
the second order terms are zero can be rejected. Thus we maintain the specification. 
This also has the advantage of more tightly enveloping the data i.e. giving each authority 
the ‘best chance’ of being efficient (or close to being efficient). 
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Figure 3 The scale elasticity for the observations used in the highways modelling4 
 
 
                                                     
 
4 It should be noted that there are 10 observations representing 3 of the smallest authorities 
that the model estimates to have a negative scale elasticity. Taken literally this would 
imply that increasing network length would actually reduce total cost. This is clearly 
counter intuitive, however such results at the extremes of the sample data are not 
uncommon in these modelling exercises as such extremes are estimated with a high 
degree of imprecision. For the purpose of the ‘what-if analysis tool’ we constrain the scale 
elasticity to be zero or positive. Given that, in reality, the ‘what-if analysis tool’ is likely to 
be used for discrete rather than marginal changes e.g. combining two authorities 
together, it is highly unlikely that this will be an issue in practice. However the need to 
provide prediction intervals from the ‘what-if analysis tool’ is something that needs to be 
incorporated into future research. 
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 Increasing RDC i.e. the average number of road defects increases cost, probably 
reflecting the need to do more maintenance to bring the network back up to a 
desired quality. 
 There are three terms in the model capturing the influence of citizen satisfaction on 
costs. It has been determined that three terms are required to fully capture the 
relationship (and this is confirmed by examining the intuition behind the implied cost 
relationship (next paragraph) and the fact that each of the terms is highly statistically 
significance). Further we are relating the cost in a given year to the Citizen 
Satisfaction score one year into the future (so 2011/12 cost data is explained by the 
July 2013 citizen satisfaction score). This is to reflect the lag in citizen perceptions of 
a (introducing this delayed relationship was suggested at a Project Steering Group 
meeting and only recently feasible due to the availability of the last Public 
Satisfaction survey data). 
The impact of citizen satisfaction is summarised in Figure 4. This shows the growth 
rate of costs for a one unit increase in citizen satisfaction (which itself is on a scale of 
0 to 100). So a large growth rate implies that if citizen satisfaction is raised by 1 unit 
this is associated with a large proportional increase in cost. Similarly a small growth 
rate implies only a small proportional increase in cost is associated with an increase 
of citizen satisfaction of 1 unit. A large growth rate does not imply that costs are 
higher (or lower) than at other values of citizen satisfaction, the growth rate refers to 
the cost impact of changes in citizen satisfaction around the measured point. 
With the above in mind, an intuitive interpretation of Figure 4 is that, at low levels of 
citizen satisfaction, improving citizen satisfaction is associated with a proportionally 
higher increase in expenditure. This could reflect two factors. Firstly growth rates are 
proportional impacts on costs. For a given growth rate, a lower cost base (which 
would intuitively be associated with low citizen satisfaction) implies a lower absolute 
cost associated with a unit increase in citizen satisfaction. So to some extent the 
higher growth rate is just compensating for this relationship. Secondly, this maybe a 
genuine behavioural phenomenon: increasing citizen satisfaction when it is at a low 
level has substantial inertia associated with large costs to overcome. At middle (or 
‘average’) levels of citizen satisfaction the growth rate is very small (and even 
negative for some observations). This could simply reflect that outside of the 
extreme the relationship between citizen satisfaction and costs is less clear. 
Ultimately there are many ways to influence citizen satisfaction, not just highway 
spending. At the high extreme, the growth rate is again high. This could reflect the 
‘law of diminishing marginal returns’; to achieve increases in citizen satisfaction 
when it is already high costs a lot. 
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Figure 4 Growth rate of cost associated with a (small) increase in citizen satisfaction at 
different levels of citizen satisfaction 
 
The following section discusses a web based tool which is being developed as part of this 
work. This will allow interrogation of the cost frontier results for each authority in more 
detail rather than the simple ‘average’ results discussed above. The aim of the tool is to 
allow an Authority to conduct ‘what-if analysis’ with respect to the cost implications of 
varying the levels of the cost drivers. 
Efficiency Predictions 
Once we have estimated the cost frontier we can determine how far each of the 54 
Authorities is from the frontier and thus what scope there is for each Authority to 
potentially make cost savings (subject of course to such an opportunity representing 
something under control of the Authority). Table 3 gives descriptive statistics for the 
distribution of efficiency predictions from this model.  
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On average (Mean) Authorities are found to be 79% efficient. Literally speaking this means, 
on average Authorities can reduce highway maintenance expenditure (100%-79%=) 21% and 
continue to maintain the same network, to the same quality and with the same traffic 
usage. 
Examining the distribution further, it can be seen that over 75% of Authorities have 
efficiency predictions above 72%, which seems intuitive. Only 10% of Authorities have 
efficiency predictions less than 63% (and, inevitably with any benchmarking analysis, it is 
likely that these 10% are probably the Authorities which are subject to data issues). Thus in 
general the spread of efficiency predictions seems intuitive. Of course, what really matters is 
whether the ranking of Authorities makes intuitive sense and we hope to gain insight into 
this via workshops, subject to confidentiality issues. 
Table 3 Distribution of efficiency predictions for the 51 Authorities5 
  
 
Results relative to earlier versions 
Since the workshops we have undertaken further analysis. In particular we have 
incorporated public satisfaction into the analysis. This has changed both the average 
efficiencies and the rankings. The average efficiency has reduced from 84% to 79%. We note 
that as a result of incorporating public satisfaction, we have had to exclude authorities that 
                                                     
 
5 The efficiency scores are averaged over the years that each Authority appears in the data, 
before the distribution is ranked to form the entries in Table 3. 
Percentile Efficiency Score
0% 45%
10% 63%
20% 70%
25% 72%
30% 74%
40% 76%
50% 82%
60% 84%
70% 86%
75% 88%
80% 89%
90% 92%
100% 100%
Mean 79%
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do not participate in the public satisfaction survey directly from the analysis. For the 
authorities which are only excluded from analysis because they have not been involved in 
the public satisfaction survey, we will, ex post of model estimation and this report, use the 
model to predict their efficiency score assuming that the authority received the average 
public satisfaction score. This is reported in the authority specific results in Section 9 where 
applicable. 
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5. WINTER SERVICE MODEL 
The Cost Frontier 
The cost variable is expenditure on all winter service activities. This covers such activities as 
gritting, ploughing and capital spend [check]. Winter service expenditure is explained by the 
following cost drivers: 
 Length of the sum of A, B and C classified roads (disaggregating further did not yield 
sensible results) and also this specification was preferred to including the sum of all 
roads or including u roads separately. 
 Length of the Precautionary Salting Network 
 Number of Non Precautionary Days 
 Percentage of road length which is classified as rural 
 The total of Tonnes of Salt used per annum  
 Time dummy variables which pick up systematic variations in expenditure over time 
(such as the results of abnormally severe winters) 
 The citizen satisfaction measure, HMBI15, interacted with a sub-set of the years; 
2008, 2009 and 2012. After investigating many functional forms (ways of 
incorporating citizen satisfaction into the model), interacting the measure with the 
year of observation was found to yield the most intuitive and best fitting approach. 
This implies that the relationship between cost and citizen satisfaction can be 
different for each year. After testing separate interactions for each year, we 
combined the years 2008, 2009 and 2012 as these had similar coefficient estimates 
(the benefit of combining is increased precision in the estimated relationship). There 
was not a significant relationship or even correct sign for the years 2010 and 2011 
and so these were dropped from the specification. The intuition of allowing this 
form, is that depending on the severity of the winter very substantially different 
amounts of cost are associated with a rise in citizen satisfaction as the higher 
standard of service has to be maintained for longer or shorter periods depending on 
the weather . A mild winter may reduce the strength of the relationship between 
citizen satisfaction and cost as cost tends to be incurred to some extent irrespective 
of whether citizen receive direct winter clearance. Note, unlike the citizen 
satisfaction measure in the highways maintenance model, here the citizen 
satisfaction measure is not offset by one year. Intuitively people notice the 
performance of winter service directly after the winter under consideration. 
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For reference, Table 4 presents the parameter estimates of the model. In comparison to the 
model developed in the pilot study, many explanatory variables have been collected and 
included in the model. The advantage of this is that this model should provide a ‘tighter fit’ 
to the data and thus maximise the chance of Authorities being found to be near the cost 
frontier. The disadvantages are twofold. Firstly there may be redundant variables i.e. 
variables which are included which actually are picking up the same effect as other 
variables. However the workshops that were run in the latter half of 2014 did not point to 
anything specific being superfluous. Secondly, including more explanatory variables reduces 
the number of complete observations. Only 34 authorities have (any years of) data for all 
these variables. In total 120 observations are used. Removing variables will most likely result 
in more observations/Authorities being included in the model. Note however for those 
authorities that are missing only one or two variables (but importantly have provided costs) 
then we can use the model to predict a minimum cost by using an average value for the 
missing data. We have not undertaken such prediction yet, but could do this in future.  
Features of the cost relationship are discussed below: 
 Network Size: As a starting point it is most useful to consider the question: How do 
costs change if the size of the network increases holding the % split between ABC 
and U roads the same, the % of the network which is rural, the proportion of roads 
which comprise the precautionary network, and the number of gritting runs per year 
constant. For this model this means to consider the effect on costs from increasing 
the length of the precautionary network, length of ABC roads and tonnes of salt used 
(as the network has got larger but the number of runs is held constant) by a given 
proportion. This indicates that if the scale of the authority is increased by 1% then 
costs increase 1.20% (=0.570+0.493+0.133); that is, there are dis-economies of scale.  
 Saying that, for a given size authority, increasing provision of winter service through 
increasing the precautionary network by 1% and by increasing correspondingly total 
salt used by 1%, increases cost by only 0.70% (=0.570+0.133). Thus there are 
increase returns to service provision. 
 Authorities with a higher proportion of rural roads, for a given size precautionary 
network and a given length of ABC roads, have lower winter service costs. 
 More non-precautionary days increase costs. For the average authority in sample; a 
1 extra precautionary day increases annual costs by 1.6%. 
 With respect to the findings on citizen satisfaction, we find a positive relationship for 
the years 2008(/09), 2009(/10) and 2012(/13). This relationship is only weakly 
significant (at the 20% level which generally is not seen as very strong). However it is 
an intuitive relationship i.e. improved citizen satisfaction is associated with higher 
cost. For the years 2010(/11) and 2011(/12) no statistically significant relationship is 
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found. In terms of the magnitude of the cost relationship, for the years 2008, 2009 
and 2012, a one unit increase in citizen satisfaction is associated with a 0.8% increase 
in cost.  
 
Table 4 Cost frontier parameter estimates  
   
    Coefficient Prob6.   
   
   
Constant 4.850107 0.0000 
YEAR=2009 0.250268 0.0126 
YEAR=2010 0.605867 0.0869 
YEAR=2011 0.531103 0.1374 
YEAR=2012 0.055344 0.4792 
LOG(Precautionary Network Length) 0.570141 0.0000 
Non-Precautionary Days 0.016703 0.0000 
Non-Precautionary Days ^2 -0.000134 0.0014 
Percentage of Highway Length that is in Rural 
Area 
-1.358983 0.0000 
LOG(Tonnes of Salt Used) 0.133083 0.0203 
LOG(Number of Salt Runs) 0.194013 0.0001 
LOG(Length of A_B_C Roads) 0.493068 0.0000 
(Citizen Satisfaction)*(YEAR=2008,2009 or 
2012) 
0.008144 0.1985 
   
Number of observations =120 , Number of Authorities = 34 
 
Efficiency Predictions 
Once we have estimated the cost frontier we can determine how far each of the 34 
Authorities is from the frontier and thus what scope there is for each Authority to 
potentially make cost savings (subject of course to such an opportunity representing 
                                                     
 
6 Prob. is a number which characterises the uncertainty with respect to the estimate. In 
particular it gives the minimum statistical significance level which is required to reject the 
null hypothesis that the variable has no influence on costs. The lower the number, the 
greater the chance that the ‘true’ parameter is different from 0. A common criteria is to 
state that a variable is statistically significant is p<0.05, or equivalently, the variable is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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something under control of the Authority). Table 5 gives descriptive statistics for the 
distribution of efficiency predictions from this model.  
On average (Mean) Authorities are found to be 92% efficient. Literally speaking this means, 
on average Authorities can reduce highway maintenance expenditure (100%-92%=) 8% and 
continue to maintain the same network, do the same number of salting runs etc. 
Examining the distribution further, it can be seen that over 75% of Authorities have 
efficiency predictions above 90%, which seems a little high. Only 10% of Authorities have 
efficiency predictions less than 88% which is remarkably high. One possible explanation for 
this is that efficiency here is evaluating a relatively narrow set of management decisions. In 
particular by including explanatory variables such as tonnes of salt used and number of runs 
undertaken, we are not considering whether the number of runs or salt used (i.e. spread 
density) is optimal, instead we assume that it is when evaluating performance. Thus there is 
an argument that efficiency differences should be small when efficiency is measured using 
this model. That is not to say that understanding the determinants of inefficiency (such as 
contracting model) are not interesting however.  
Table 5 Distribution of efficiency predictions for the 33 Authorities7 
  
                                                     
 
7 The efficiency scores are averaged over the years that each Authority appears in the data, 
before the distribution is ranked to form the entries in Table 3. 
Percentile Efficiency 
Score
0% 77%
10% 88%
20% 89%
25% 90%
30% 90%
40% 92%
50% 92%
60% 93%
70% 94%
75% 94%
80% 95%
90% 97%
100% 100%
Mean 92%
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6. STREET LIGHTING MODEL 
The street lighting cost category was included in the Pilot Study. As such this work is a 
continuation. While new data was requested, such as proportion of units LED and 
proportion of units on part time operation, the data response rate for these variables were 
not sufficient to include them in the analysis. As such the variables available for analysis 
were the same as for the Pilot Study. 
The Cost Frontier 
The cost category is all street lighting expenditure. Cost drivers are the number of lighting 
columns and the citizen satisfaction measure (KBI25) relating to satisfaction with street 
lighting. This measure is included in the model as the value from the proceeding year i.e. we 
use the value surveyed 16 months after the end of the financial year we are modelling. The 
motivation for doing is this is that it is important to recognise the lag effect in measuring 
citizen satisfaction.  
Compared to the model in the Pilot Study, this model does not contain the explanatory 
factor of the proportion of lighting units operational. The reason for the lack of inclusion 
was that when it was included, the implied relationship with cost was negative i.e. the fewer 
lighting units that were inoperative the lower the cost. This seems counter intuitive given 
that it would be expected that the higher proportion of lighting units operational, the 
quicker a response required when a light failed (to maintain over time the same level of 
operational units). This is counter to the finding of a positive relationship in the Pilot Study. 
The functional form adopted is flexible, i.e. the relationship between cost and the two cost 
drivers varies with the level of the cost drivers. As such care has to be taken in 
interpretation. Table 6 reports the parameter estimates for the model. There are two key 
aspects to focus on: 
 The results on economies of scale: the variables relating to number of lighting 
columns capture the relationship between cost and the size of the authority. For the 
average authority, a literal interpretation of the model estimates is that a 1% 
increase in the number of street lights maintained results in a 1.13% increase in costs 
i.e. at the size of the average authority, unit costs (cost divided by number of street 
lights) increase if that authority gets larger; that is there are diseconomies of scale at 
the sample mean. However the hypothesis that this estimate is consistent with the 
null hypothesis of constant returns to scale i.e. constant unit cost canot be rejected.  
However, the model formulation means that this relationship is flexible enough to 
allow economies of scale to vary with the number of lighting columns. Figure 5 
summarises this relationship for the authorities in sample. It shows that small 
authorities (measured by number of lighting columns) suffer from economies of 
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scale, that is they have unit costs which fall as they get larger. However eventually an 
authority gets so large that unit costs start to rise again. This minimum efficient scale 
point is found to be approximately 40 000 lighting units (elasticity=1). 
Figure 5 Elasticity of cost with respect to the number of lighting units 
 
 In the same way as adopted in the Highways Model, there are three terms in the 
model capturing the influence of citizen satisfaction on costs. It has been determined 
that three terms are required to fully capture the relationship (and this is confirmed 
by examining the intuition behind the implied cost relationship (next paragraph) and 
the fact that each of the terms is highly statistically significance).  
The impact of citizen satisfaction is summarised in Figure 6. This shows the growth 
rate of costs for a one unit increase in citizen satisfaction (which itself is on a scale of 
0 to 100). So a large growth rate implies that if citizen satisfaction is raised by 1 unit 
this is associated with a large proportional increase in cost. Similarly a small growth 
rate implies only a small proportional increase in cost is associated with an increase 
of citizen satisfaction of 1 unit. A large growth rate does not imply that costs are 
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higher (or lower) than at other values of citizen satisfaction, the growth rate refers to 
the cost impact of changes in citizen satisfaction around the measured point. 
With the above in mind, an intuitive interpretation of Figure 6 is that for low levels of 
citizen satisfaction a high proportional increase in expenditure is associated with 
improving citizen satisfaction. This could reflect two factors. For a given growth rate, 
a lower cost base (which would intuitively be associated with low citizen satisfaction) 
implies a lower absolute cost associated with a unit increase in citizen satisfaction. 
So to some extent the higher growth rate is just compensating for this relationship. 
Secondly, this maybe a genuine behavioural phenomenon; increasing citizen 
satisfaction when it is at a low level has substantial inertia associated with large costs 
to overcome. At middle (or ‘average’) levels of citizen satisfaction the growth rate is 
very small (and even negative for some observations). This could simply reflect that 
outside of the extreme the relationship between citizen satisfaction and costs is less 
clear. Ultimately there are many ways to influence citizen satisfaction, not just 
spending on Street Lighting. At the high extreme, the growth rate is again high. This 
could reflect the ‘law of diminishing marginal returns’; to achieve increases in citizen 
satisfaction when it is already high costs a lot. 
Table 6 Parameter estimates for the cost frontier 
   
   
 Coefficient Prob.   
   
   
Constant -16.29098 0.3752 
LOG(Street Lighting numbers) 1.133915 0.0000 
LOG(Street Lighting numbers)^2 0.203035 0.0608 
Street Lighting numbers >150000 -0.522655 0.1053 
YEAR=2009 -0.132084 0.2903 
YEAR=2010 0.013284 0.9197 
YEAR=2011 0.050311 0.7066 
YEAR=2012 0.147868 0.3153 
Citizen satisfaction 1.598334 0.0827 
(Citizen satisfaction)^2 -0.027611 0.0684 
(Citizen satisfaction) ^3 0.000158 0.0540 
   
   
 
Number of observations = 180 Number of authorities = 50 
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Figure 6 Growth rate of cost associated with a (small) increase in citizen satisfaction at 
different levels of citizen satisfaction 
 
Efficiency Predictions 
Once we have estimated the cost frontier we can determine how far each of the 50 
Authorities is from the frontier and thus what scope there is for each Authority to 
potentially make cost savings (subject of course to such an opportunity representing 
something under control of the Authority).  
Firstly, it should be recognised the special difficulties in deriving these efficiency predictions 
from this model, which has implications for how robust the efficiency predictions from this 
model should be viewed. The conventional means of computation of the efficiency scores 
i.e. the pooled approach used in the first two models, fails to find any reasonable variation 
in efficiency from this model. Further other approaches (such as the time invariant approach 
used as a complement in the Gully model – see next section) also yielded very implausible 
results. The only approach that yielded efficiency predictions which has roughly a sensible 
distribution was to adopt a relatively sophisticated computation known as a True Random 
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Effects approach (Greene, Journal of Econometrics, 2005). Ultimately the problem appears 
to be in the distribution of the data, particularly the cost data. For many authorities it is 
fluctuating relatively widely from year to year. This, in turn, implies a substantial amount of 
unexplained variation in any estimated model8, which results in very unstable inefficiency 
predictions (unstable from one method to another). It is recommended that there is a 
working group formed to explore the reasons for the cost data variations to take this model 
forward.  
However, we proceed to describe the distribution of the predicted efficiency scores. Table 7 
gives descriptive statistics for the distribution of efficiency predictions from this model. The 
average score is 92% which literally implies that on average an authority can reduce their 
costs by (100-92=) 8% can still maintain the same street lighting network at the same citizen 
satisfaction. This seems plausible 
However there are two specific issues with this distribution. First there is a lot of variation 
within the years for each authority. This is averaged away and so not reflected in this 
distribution (footnote 9 is important in explaining the averaging process). Second, the 
middle 50 percentile only has an efficiency variation of five percentage points. This is partly 
a symptom of the first point. Overall a further iteration with stakeholders is required to 
improve this model. 
                                                     
 
8 One simple way to quantify this unexplained part of the model is to examine the R-squared 
from the regression. This shows the proportion of the variation in the (log) cost variable 
explained by the regression variables; thus a higher figure indicates lower unexplained 
variation. For this model the R-Squared is 0.57, for the other cost categories the R-
Squared is in excess of 0.85, indicating that this model has poor explanatory power 
relative to the models for the other cost categories. 
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Table 7 Distribution of efficiency predictions for the 50 Authorities9 
 
                                                     
 
9 The efficiency scores are averaged over the years that each Authority appears in the data, 
before the distribution is ranked to form the entries in Table 3. 
Percentile Efficiency 
Score
0% 75%
10% 86%
20% 89%
25% 91%
30% 92%
40% 92%
50% 93%
60% 95%
70% 95%
75% 95%
80% 96%
90% 98%
100% 100%
Mean 92%
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7. GULLY CLEARANCE MODEL 
The Cost Frontier 
The Gully Clearance model is the first time that this cost category has entered the analysis; 
that is, it was not in the pilot study. As a result the model should be seen as a ‘first pass’ at 
modelling this cost category. Further discussions at the working groups held in October and 
November pointed to this being a difficult cost category to model, partly reflecting the lack 
of robust asset register data.  
For this analysis we have the following variables available to explain gully clearance costs: 
 Number of Gullies – This is a measure of the relevant scale of the operation 
 Number of Gullies Cleared per Annum – This captures the intensity of activity 
 Proportion of network (by km) in rural areas – This captures the likely difference in 
complexity in the drainage network in rural and urban areas. 
 Proportion of network (by km) which is U road – U roads could be conceptualised as 
requiring a lower drainage provision than A, B or C roads, all other things equal. 
 Dummy variables capturing year on year systematic expenditure differences 
(common to all authorities) 
 Note, no citizen satisfaction measure is available for this cost category (there has 
recently been a relevant question added for the year 2012 onwards, but given this is 
the last year in sample, including it would severely limit the sample size). 
The parameter estimates of the cost frontier are given in Table 8. The form of the model is 
again a flexible functional form (similar to the highways and street lighting models). In 
general this seems a sensible model: 
 In terms of how costs change as the scale or size of the operation increases, this can 
be seen in Figure 6. The plot shows how the cost elasticity with respect to the scale 
of operation increases (here allowing both the number of gullies and the number of 
gullies cleared per annum to increase10). It shows that there is an increasing 
elasticity, indicating that initially there are falling unit costs (cost per gully) from 
expanding the scale of an authority. However there comes a point, at approximately 
                                                     
 
10 The number of gullies cleared has to increase otherwise the computation would assume 
that the network size increased but that no more gullies were cleared. 
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100 000 gullies, when diseconomies of scale kick in and unit costs start to rise. This is 
intuitive. At the sample mean of the data, the elasticity has a value of 1.11, however 
the null hypothesis that this estimate is equal to one can not be rejected (at the 10% 
level), so for the average authority, we conclude that they are operating close to the 
minimum efficient scale point (i.e. minimum average costs (at least if they are 
efficient)). Of course, there are smaller and larger authorities around the mean. 
Figure 6 Cost elasticity with respect to the scale of Authority 
 
 There are different findings for examining, for a fixed size of authority i.e. a fixed 
number of gullies, how costs change when more gullies are cleared. The relevant 
cost elasticity is shown in Figure 7. This shows that for all authorities there are 
economies of gully clearance i.e. unit costs (average cost divided by the number of 
gully cleared) fall as more gullies are cleared for a fixed size network of gullies. At the 
sample mean the cost elasticity is 0.26 which indicates that a 1% increase in gullies 
cleared results in an increase in cost of only 0.26%. Further for authorities which 
clear a large amount of gullies, the cost of further increase is lower than for an 
authority clearing fewer gullies i.e. the elasticity falls.  
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Figure 7 Elasticity of cost with respect to the number gullies cleared per annum 
 
 Both the proportion of the network length that is in rural areas and the proportion of 
network which is U road are found to have a negative effect on costs. This is as 
expected given the likely lower complexity of rural drainage systems and the less 
demanding u road system. 
 The year dummy variables are found to be statistically insignificant but are retained 
to capture any inflation or systematic input price variation over time. 
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Table 8 Parameter estimates of the Gully Clearance cost frontier 
   
   
 Coefficient Prob.   
   
   
Constant 
15.60349 
0.0000 
LOG(Number of Gullies) 
0.851189 0.0000 
LOG(Number of Gullies Cleared) 
0.262507 0.0069 
LOG(Number of Gullies)^2 
0.335168 
0.0511 
LOG(Number of Gullies Cleared)^2 
-0.097442 
0.3630 
LOG(Number of Gullies)*LOG(Number of Gullies Cleared) 
0.043248 
0.8736 
Percentage of Network in Rural Areas -0.948507 0.0149 
Proportion of Network that is U Road -3.069134 0.0004 
YEAR=2009 0.041510 0.6037 
YEAR=2010 -0.053091 0.5664 
YEAR=2011 -0.059550 0.4643 
YEAR=2012 0.010913 0.8930 
   
   
Number of observations =131 , Number of Authorities = 40 
 
Efficiency Predictions 
Once we have estimated the cost frontier we can determine how far each of the 40 
Authorities is from the frontier and thus what scope there is for each Authority to 
potentially make cost savings (subject of course to such an opportunity representing 
something under control of the Authority). Table 9 gives descriptive statistics for the 
distribution of efficiency predictions from this model. The efficiency predictions are actually 
produced from two methods of computing efficiency from cost frontiers (one approach – 
which is the one adopted for the highways and winter service model – is to allow for flexible 
time variation in inefficiency, while the other is to assume inefficiency is time invariant). 
Importantly, both methods yield very similar predictions in terms of rankings of authorities, 
but both approaches have merits in this case; hence why they are averaged. 
Efficiency is found to be 83% on average. This means that for the average authority, costs 
can be reduced by (100-83=)17% if the authority adopted best practice, all other things 
equal i.e. they had the same network and cleared the same number of gullies per annum. 
75% of authorities have efficiency scores above 75% and this seems intuitively reasonable. 
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Table 9 Summary of the efficiency predictions 
 
Percentile Efficiency 
Score
0% 64%
10% 68%
20% 75%
25% 75%
30% 76%
40% 78%
50% 81%
60% 87%
70% 88%
75% 91%
80% 95%
90% 98%
100% 100%
Mean 83%
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8. APPENDIX: DETAILED ECONOMIC AND STATISTICAL CONCEPTS 
Interpreting the minimum cost frontier 
The cost frontier relates cost to the drivers of cost. In order to estimate this relationship, 
further structure needs to be imposed on the relationship. In particular we estimate the 
model by assuming that the model is a constant elasticity model. We do this for a number of 
reasons. Firstly it allows us to easily derive the efficiency scores from the model. Second it is 
easy to estimate and the coefficients (the values we estimate) can be interpreted as cost 
elasticities. A cost elasticity with respect to cost driver x is the % change in cost resulting 
from a 1% change in cost driver x. A positive cost elasticity implies a positive relationship 
between cost and the driver; while negative cost elasticity implies a negative relationship 
between cost and the driver. Further the size of the coefficient has a useful interpretation: 
 If (in absolute value) the elasticity is equal to one, then costs change proportionally with 
the cost driver. If we consider the cost driver to be output then an elasticity value of one 
indicates constant returns to scale. This implies that average costs (or unit costs) do not 
change as the scale of operation increases. In practice this means that large authorities 
do not face scale advantages (or disadvantages) relative to smaller authorities. 
 If (in absolute value) the elasticity is less than one, then costs change proportionally less 
with the cost driver. Again, if we consider the cost driver to be output then an elasticity 
value of one indicates increasing returns to scale. This implies that average costs (or unit 
costs) fall as the scale of operation increases. This implies that a larger authority has a 
unit cost advantage over a smaller authority. Notice that this is a property of the cost 
relationship; thus any efficiency score should not penalize a smaller authority for simply 
being small. Thus we control for these effects separately to the efficiency score 
computation11.  
 If (in absolute value) the elasticity is less than one, then costs change proportionally 
more with the cost driver. Again, if we consider the cost driver to be output then an 
elasticity value of one indicates decreasing returns to scale. This implies that average 
costs (or unit costs) increase as the scale of operation increases. This implies that a 
larger authority has a unit cost disadvantage over a smaller authority. Again, notice that 
this is a property of the cost relationship; thus any efficiency score should not penalize a 
larger authority for simply being large. Thus we control for these effects separately to 
the efficiency score computation. 
                                                     
 
11 Findings on economies of scale may be useful in evaluating the potential for unit cost 
saving from merging functions across a number of authorities however. 
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Statistical note: The constant elasticity model is estimated by first transforming variables 
into logarithms (the statistical reason for doing this is that the model becomes linear in 
parameters which makes life easier). Further, we can consider (and test) generalisations to 
this model such that the elasticities are no longer constant but vary with the level of the 
cost drivers. This provides a better fit of the data, but potentially introduces spurious 
accuracy. At this early stage of the work we maintain the constant elasticity model. 
Statistical testing and significance 
When we estimate a model, we are trying to use a sample of data (in this case from 46 
authorities for a select number of years) to learn about the properties of the cost frontier 
for the population (in this case all authorities over many years). Thus any numbers that we 
generate will have a degree of error around them in the sense of how close they are to the 
‘true’ values. We can use statistical testing to better understand if our estimates are 
different from a given level. An example would be we wish to test whether a cost driver 
does actually impact on cost. In this case we want to find evidence against the value of the 
relevant cost elasticity being zero (no impact). This is called the null hypothesis.  
Importantly, a necessary limitation of statistical analysis is that we can never say with 
certainty that an estimate is different from a given value; there is always some (hopefully 
small) probability that the true estimate could be zero (in the example above) irrespective of 
the value of our estimate. Instead we make probabilistic statements. In particular we 
compute a test which allows us to state whether we can reject the null hypothesis at a 
certain significance level. The significance level represents the probability that we reject the 
null hypothesis when it is true i.e. the percentage of times (in resampling) that we make the 
wrong judgement in rejecting the null. Clearly we wish to reject the null and have a very low 
chance of us being wrong. Thus a statistical test reports the minimum statistical significance 
level possible to reject the null (reported as a p-value). Ultimately we have more faith in our 
decision to reject the null if the p-value is small.  
It is important to note the following: statistical testing only allows us to reject a null 
hypothesis; importantly we cannot accept a null hypothesis through statistical testing alone. 
This is important and best illustrated by an example. Consider if we are modelling street 
lighting costs and find that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the cost elasticity with 
respect to number of street lighting columns is zero (fortunately in Section 4 we show this is 
not the case!). If we accepted the null hypothesis then we would be saying that street 
lighting costs are not impacted upon by the number of street lights! But this is not what the 
statistical test would imply. All it would say is that we find no evidence against the 
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hypothesis, not that it itself is true.12 Thus it is likely that we would retain number of street 
lighting columns in the model. 
Statistical estimation methodology 
There are a number of statistical techniques that can be used to estimate the cost frontier 
and predict each authority’s efficiency score. Most readers will have heard about linear 
regression. This is a useful technique but does not allow for an authority to be operating 
above the minimum possible cost. As such we have to depart from the usual “fitting a line 
through a cloud of points”. 
For the purpose of this report we adopt the techniques known as ‘pooled stochastic frontier 
analysis’. The advantages of this approach, relative to other approaches, can be summarised 
as: 
 The method accounts for statistical noise as well as inefficiency. Thus there is an attempt 
to distinguish between random events outside the model which influence costs and the 
remaining inefficiency 
 The method produces plausible predictions of inefficiency as compared to other 
approaches which ignore statistical noise (where the efficiency scores are implausibly 
small) 
 The method can deal with the highly unbalanced nature of the panel. This presents 
problems to more standard methods which are used to analyse panel data since for a 
large number of authorities we only have one or two years of data. 
However it is also important to acknowledge the disadvantages with this approach, 
primarily the need for distributional assumptions to be made to identify noise from 
inefficiency. Ultimately there is little choice at present as to which approach to use. As the 
dataset develops, and in particular as the number of years per authority increases, so more 
panel data specific methods (which are more robust) can be applied. 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
12 Intuitively the reason for this distinction is as well as failing to reject the null hypothesis of 
zero impact, we would also fail to reject may other possible null hypothesis including 
those that make sense!    
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Full Statistical Output 
For reference, the full statistical output for estimation of the cost frontiers is provided 
below: 
Highways model 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(HIGHEXP)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/01/14   Time: 20:28
Sample: 2008 2012 IF STR<>63
Periods included: 5
Cross-sections included: 51
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 145
Period weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 12.07246 1.519077 7.947235 0
LOG(A_B_C_ROADM) 0.598615 0.249882 2.395591 0.018
LOG(A_B_C_ROADM) 2^ 0.252549 0.30836 0.819007 0.4143
YEAR=2009 -0.0599 0.139351 -0.429834 0.668
YEAR=2010 0.009003 0.118828 0.075763 0.9397
YEAR=2011 0.066629 0.130504 0.510547 0.6105
YEAR=2012 -0.0008 0.126703 -0.006278 0.995
LOG(UROADSM) 0.070764 0.29705 0.238223 0.8121
LOG(UROADSM) 2^ 1.000454 0.637707 1.56883 0.1191
LOG(A_B_C_ROADM)*LOG(UROADSM) -0.97845 0.874232 -1.119212 0.2651
RDC 0.023207 0.008155 2.845878 0.0051
LOG(TDENM) 0.106203 0.175176 0.606267 0.5454
HMBI01LAG 0.389815 0.150744 2.585935 0.0108
HMBI01LAG 2^ -0.01198 0.004791 -2.500486 0.0136
HMBI01LAG 3^ 0.000117 4.90E-05 2.385188 0.0185
R-squared 0.805762     Mean dependent var 16.28177
Adjusted R-squared 0.784844     S.D. dependent var 0.947569
S.E. of regression 0.439529     Akaike info criterion 1.291472
Sum squared resid 25.11416     Schwarz criterion 1.59941
Log likelihood -78.6317     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.416598
F-statistic 38.5201     Durbin-Watson stat 0.514798
Prob(F-statistic) 0
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Winter Service model 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(WINTER_EXP)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/01/14   Time: 20:32
Sample: 2008 2012 IF STR<>63
Periods included: 5
Cross-sections included: 34
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 120
Period weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 4.850107 0.583534 8.311611 0.0000
YEAR=2009 0.250268 0.098607 2.53803 0.0126
YEAR=2010 0.605867 0.350691 1.727636 0.0869
YEAR=2011 0.531103 0.354852 1.496688 0.1374
YEAR=2012 0.055344 0.077943 0.710053 0.4792
LOG(PREC_NETW) 0.570141 0.11082 5.144735 0.0000
NONPREC_DAYS 0.016703 0.003907 4.274592 0.0000
NONPREC_DAYS 2^ -0.000134 4.09E-05 -3.282611 0.0014
PERC_RURAL -1.358983 0.301544 -4.506753 0.0000
LOG(TONNES_SALT) 0.133083 0.056474 2.35653 0.0203
LOG(SALT_RUNS) 0.194013 0.048081 4.035096 0.0001
LOG(A_B_C_ROAD) 0.493068 0.095282 5.174821 0.0000
(HMBI15)*((YEAR=2008)+(YEAR=2009)+(YEAR=2012))0.008144 0.006294 1.29397 0.1985
R-squared 0.94341     Mean dependent var 14.18146
Adjusted R-squared 0.937063     S.D. dependent var 1.072862
S.E. of regression 0.269151     Akaike info criterion 0.314919
Sum squared resid 7.751351     Schwarz criterion 0.616897
Log likelihood -5.895145     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.437554
F-statistic 148.6482     Durbin-Watson stat 0.647006
Prob(F-statistic) 0
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Street Lighting Model 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(LIGHT_EXP)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/02/14   Time: 13:22
Sample: 2008 2012
Periods included: 5
Cross-sections included: 54
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 180
Period weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -16.291 18.32406 -0.889049 0.3752
LOG(LIGHT_NOM) 1.133915 0.093003 12.19224 0
LOG(LIGHT_NOM)^2 0.203035 0.107557 1.887699 0.0608
LIGHT_NO>150000 -0.52266 0.320983 -1.628295 0.1053
YEAR=2009 -0.13208 0.124521 -1.060733 0.2903
YEAR=2010 0.013284 0.131633 0.100913 0.9197
YEAR=2011 0.050311 0.133425 0.377069 0.7066
YEAR=2012 0.147868 1.47E-01 1.007199 0.3153
KBI25LAG 1.598334 0.915676 1.745524 0.0827
KBI25LAG^2 -0.02761 0.015054 -1.834158 0.0684
KBI25LAG^3 0.000158 8.16E-05 1.940402 0.054
R-squared 0.568766     Mean dependent var 14.45223
Adjusted R-squared 0.543249     S.D. dependent var 0.846018
S.E. of regression 0.571767     Akaike info criterion 1.778993
Sum squared resid 55.24903     Schwarz criterion 1.974118
Log likelihood -149.109     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.858108
F-statistic 22.28987     Durbin-Watson stat 0.200887
Prob(F-statistic) 0
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Gully Clearance Model 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(GULLY_EXP)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/04/14   Time: 13:06
Sample: 2008 2012
Periods included: 5
Cross-sections included: 40
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 131
Period weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 15.60349 0.731819 21.32152 0
LOG(NO_GULLIESM) 0.851189 0.116281 7.320123 0
LOG(NO_GULLIES_CLEAREDM) 0.262507 0.095393 2.751835 0.0069
LOG(NO_GULLIESM)^2 0.335168 0.170122 1.970159 0.0511
LOG(NO_GULLIES_CLEAREDM)^2 -0.09744 0.10671 -0.91314 0.363
LOG(NO_GULLIESM)*LOG(NO_GULLIES_CLEAREDM)0.043248 0.271213 0.159461 0.8736
PERC_RURAL -0.94851 0.383774 -2.47153 0.0149
UPROPORTION -3.06913 8.38E-01 -3.66265 0.0004
YEAR=2009 0.04151 0.07975 0.520505 0.6037
YEAR=2010 -0.05309 0.092344 -0.57492 0.5664
YEAR=2011 -0.05955 0.081112 -0.73417 0.4643
YEAR=2012 0.010913 0.080954 0.134801 0.893
R-squared 0.867583     Mean dependent var13.00277
Adjusted R-squared 0.855343     S.D. dependent var 0.799386
S.E. of regression 0.304037     Akaike info criterion0.543799
Sum squared resid 11.00019     Schwarz criterion 0.807176
Log likelihood -23.6188     Hannan-Quinn criter.0.650821
F-statistic 70.87957     Durbin-Watson stat 0.452731
Prob(F-statistic) 0
